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DisengagementEven though disgust and fear are both negative emotions, they are characterized by different physiology and
action tendencies. The aim of this studywas to examine whether fear- and disgust-evoking images would pro-
duce different attention bias effects, specifically those related to attention (dis)engagement. Participants were
asked to identify a target which was briefly presented around a central image cue, which could either be dis-
gusting, frightening, or neutral. The interval between cue onset and target presentation varied within blocks
(200, 500, 800, 1100 ms), allowing us to investigate the time course of attention engagement. Accuracy was
lower and reaction times were longer when targets quickly (200 ms) followed disgust-evoking images than
when they followed neutral- or fear-evoking images. For the other, longer interval conditions no significant
image effects were found. These results suggest that emotion-specific attention effects can be found at very
early visual processing stages and that only disgust-evoking images, and not fear-evoking ones, keep hold
of our attention for longer. We speculate that this increase in early attention allocation is related to the
need to perform a more comprehensive risk-assessment of the disgust-evoking images. The outcomes under-
line not only the importance of examining the time course of emotion induced attention effects but also the
need to look beyond the dimensions of valence and arousal.
© 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Through selective attention, our brain guides our behavior toward en-
vironmental stimuli that are relevant for survival, especially when they
imply immediate danger (Vuilleumier, 2005). Evidence for this notion,
comes from experimental and clinical studies that have used a variety of
stimuli (e.g., pictures, faces, words) and paradigms that tap into different
aspects of attention (for reviews see, Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin,
Bakermans-Kranenburg, & Van IJzendoorn, 2007; Cisler, Bacon, & Wil-
liams, 2009;Weierich, Treat, & Hollingworth, 2008; Yiend, 2010). Results
from most of these studies suggest that there exists an attention bias to-
ward threatening or fear-evoking stimuli, particularly in high-anxious in-
dividuals. Results however, do not conclusively indicate whether this
attention bias constitutes facilitated attention toward threatening stimuli,
impaired disengagement from them, or both (e.g., Fox, Russo, Bowles, &
Dutton, 2001; Koster, Crombez, Van Damme, Verschuere, & De Houwer,
2004; Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, Van Damme, & Wiersema, 2006).
Methodological variables, such as stimulus duration and stimulus threat
value, as well as individual differences in anxiety seem to modulate thee Psychology, VU University
am, The Netherlands. Tel.: +31
rights reserved.pattern of results (Cisler, Olatunji, Lohr, & Williams, 2009; Mogg &
Bradley, 1998).
One remarkable observation in many of these studies is that re-
searchers often refer to effects of ‘threatening’ or ‘fear-evoking’ in-
formation, while they have actually used stimulus materials that are
‘negative’ and ‘arousing’, according to the database they were selected
from (e.g., Affective Norms for English Words — ANEW, Bradley &
Lang, 1999; International Affective Picture System — IAPS, Lang,
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008). While threatening words and pictures
are evidently negative and most times arousing, not all negative stim-
uli are necessarily threatening or fear-evoking. Moreover, a large
number of negative, arousing IAPS images that are typically classified
as highly threatening (e.g., pictures showing injuries, mutilations, or
burn victims) have in fact been found to elicit stronger feelings of ‘dis-
gust’ than of ‘fear’ (Libkuman, Otani, Kern, Viger, & Novak, 2007;
Mikels et al., 2005). It is therefore disputable whether the previously
reported attention bias effects (particularly those with reference to
IAPS pictures) can be attributed solely to fear and the purely threaten-
ing nature of the stimuli used. Indeed, in such cases, it is more appro-
priate to explain the observed effects in terms of the stimulus selection
criteria applied, namely valence (e.g., Pratto & John, 1991) or arousal
(e.g., Schimmack, 2005; Vogt, De Houwer, Koster, Van Damme, &
Crombez, 2008). Nevertheless, this does not rule out the possibility
that there are emotion-specific attention effects, whichmay be unique
for fear- or disgust-evoking images.
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areas (Calder, Lawrence, & Young, 2001; Murphy, Nimmo-Smith, &
Lawrence, 2003) and are linked to different action tendencies
(Susskind et al., 2008), it is feasible that they also affect attention
differentially. Moreover, while fear is believed to enhance sensory ac-
quisition in order to deal quickly and efficiently with threatening cir-
cumstances, disgust more likely serves the function of diminishing
environmental input in order to avoid contamination (Susskind et
al., 2008). Furthermore, while the first process is believed to be fast
and largely automatic, the latter presumably develops more slowly
and depends more on focal attention (Anderson, Christoff, Panitz, De
Rosa, & Gabrieli, 2003; Santos, Iglesias, Olivares, & Young, 2008). Con-
sequently, if fear- and disgust-evoking stimuli indeed affect attention
differently then it seems unjustified to treat them as one single
category. Moreover, an inconsistent use of negative, arousing stimulus
materials that could be either, threatening, disgusting, or both, could
have been responsible for some of the contrasting findings reported in
the literature.
Hardly any behavioral studies have directly compared attention ef-
fects for threat-related versus disgust-related stimuli, but those that
have done so found larger attention biases for the latter. For example,
using a modified Stroop task, Charash and McKay (2002) found
that color-naming of disgust-related words (e.g., vomit) was delayed
relative to neutral words (e.g., igloo), while a similar effect was not
present for fear-related words (e.g., tumor). Using the same sets of
words in a rapid serial visual processing paradigm (RSVP), Cisler,
Olatunji, et al. (2009) found that probes were more difficult to detect
following disgust targets than following fear targets. Results from both
experiments suggest that attention disengagement is more difficult
from disgust-related words than from fear-related words. In a recent
event-related potential (ERP) study, similar results were found for pic-
torial stimuli (Carretié, Ruiz-Padial, López-Martín, & Albert, 2011).
Participants in this study responded slower and less accurate in a digit
categorization task when the targets were presented superimposed on
disgust pictures than on fearful or neutral pictures. In addition, only
the disgust pictures were found to elicit larger P2 components than
the neutral pictures, suggesting that specifically these images, and
not the fearful ones, received more attention during early percep-
tual processing. In contrast, Ciesielski, Armstrong, Zald, and Olatunji
(2010) observed an equal drop in detection accuracy when targets
were presented in a RSVP stream following fear- and disgust-image
distracters as compared to neutral ones. In addition, for both types of
negative images detection accuracy became gradually better with
longer time lags, suggesting a similar development in attention
allocation over time. Nevertheless, close inspection of their data also
showed that at the shortest time lag (200 ms), accuracy was slightly
lower following disgust- as compared to fear-images, suggesting
somewhat greater attention allocation to the disgust pictures at early
processing stages.
The main aim of the present study was to provide further evidence
that fear- and disgust-evoking images produce different attention bias
effects, perhaps not only in magnitude but also in onset and duration.
First, we carefully selected our stimulus materials by means of an in-
dependent rating study, ensuring that the pictures (from the IAPS
database) generated feelings of fear or disgust, while keeping their
arousal and valence ratings constant. We then employed a covert
orienting paradigm (modeled after Fox et al., 2001, Experiment 5) to
investigate whether these two sets of negative pictures would hold
participants' attention to different extent and/or at different times fol-
lowing picture onset. In Fox et al.'s paradigm, task-irrelevant affective
cues were presented at fixation, in focus of attention, while partici-
pants were required to identify a target that was briefly presented in
the surrounding of this cue after a brief interval. Difficulty with disen-
gaging attention from the central image cuewould result in prolonged
target identification times. Indeed, while using a cue-target interval of
600 ms, Fox et al. (2001) found that anxious individuals took longer toidentify a peripheral target when they fixated on a threat-related
word than when they fixated on a neutral or positive word.
In a novel adaptation of this paradigm, we systematically varied
the time interval between cue onset and target presentation, which
allowed us to investigate not only the existence and magnitude of
attention (dis)engagement but also its time course. In general, the lon-
ger the cue-target interval, the more time participants have to disen-
gage their attention from the central image cue. At relatively longer
cue-target intervals, it can therefore be expected that response delays
for the distinct emotion cues are no longer present or even show the
opposite pattern, in case of attention avoidance (cf., Mogg, Bradley,
Miles, & Dixon, 2004). In the current experiment, we used cue-target
intervals of 200, 500, 800, and 1100 ms, respectively. These intervals
were chosen to enable investigation of emotion-specific differences
(fear versus disgust) in both early attention (dis)engagement and
subsequent attention avoidance.
Based on previous research, we hypothesized that it would take
longer to identify targets paired with negative image cues (both
disgust- and fear-evoking) than those paired with neutral cues (e.g.,
Fox et al., 2001; Koster et al., 2006; Vogt et al., 2008). Furthermore,
in accord with the findings by Carretié et al. (2011), such response
delay was expected to be more prominent for the disgust-evoking im-
ages than for the fear-evoking images, reflecting superior attention
holding capacities of the former. Finally, given the respective functions
of fear and disgust (e.g., Susskind et al., 2008), we reasoned that atten-
tion engagement effects for fear-evoking images may be more tran-
sient to those of the disgust-evoking images (thus response delays
more restricted to the shorter cue-target intervals) and less likely to
convert into attention avoidance (thus no quicker target identification
at the longest cue-target interval).
2. Method
2.1. Participants
Thirty female university students took part in this experiment,
earning either course credits or 5€ for their participation. They were
aged between 19 and 30 years (M=21.0 years). Only females were
recruited because our stimulus selection procedure (see below) re-
vealed significant gender differences as to how the IAPS pictures
were rated in terms of arousal and valence (see also, Lang et al.,
2008; Weinberg & Hajcak, 2010). In addition, previous studies have
shown that women are characteristically more disgust sensitive
than men (Charash, McKay, & DiPaolo, 2006) and display greater vig-
ilance for threat-related information (Dickie & Armony, 2008). Using
an all-female sample would therefore remove a confounding variable.
2.2. Stimulus selection
Forty IAPS pictures were selected for the experimental task on the
basis of an independent rating study consisting of 160 IAPS pictures
(Lang et al., 2008). For this rating study, 40 pictures were chosen
based on their estimated likelihood of generating feelings of disgust.
These pictures depicted dead animals, dirty toilets, contaminated
food, crawling animals (e.g., cockroaches, maggots), and disgusting
actions (e.g. vomiting). Forty other pictures were chosen based on
their likelihood of eliciting feelings of fear. They depicted aggressive
animals (e.g., dogs, sharks), pointed guns, violent actions, and danger-
ous scenes (e.g., riots, car accidents). Pictures that were believed to
generate feelings of both fear and disgust (e.g., mutilation, spiders)
were discarded. Finally, eighty neutral pictures were chosen, showing
tranquil animals, household objects, peaceful scenes, and simple ev-
eryday actions (e.g., typing, reading). All pictures were adjusted into
equally sized squares.
Twenty-seven independent judges (15 females, 18–24 years)
were asked to rate arousal and valence of the 160 chosen IAPS pictures
Table 1









Arousal rating 1.86 (0.31) 5.40 (0.42) 5.64 (0.54) t(18)=1.09; p=.29
Valence rating 6.54 (0.46) 2.76 (0.41) 2.52 (0.43) t(18)=1.28; p=.22
Fear rating 1.00 (0.00) 3.24 (0.32) 1.57 (0.24) t(18)=13.33; pb .001
Disgust rating 1.00 (0.00) 2.08 (0.35) 4.06 (0.33) t(18)=13.02; pb .001
Note: t-test results concern differences between the disgust- and fear-evoking pictures. In all cases neutral pictures had significantly lower arousal, fear, and disgust ratings and
higher valence ratings than both the disgust- and fear-evoking pictures. IAPS numbers of fear-evoking pictures: 1300, 1304, 1525, 1930, 1932, 6231, 6250, 6571, 9902, 9910;
disgust-evoking pictures: 3019, 9031, 9043, 9185, 9300, 9302, 9322, 9326, 9373, 9571; neutral pictures: 1500, 2036, 2102, 2377, 2383, 2393, 2396, 2411, 2560, 2593, 2850,
5390, 7001, 7026, 7041, 7050, 7057, 7235, 7493, 7513.
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(SAM; Bradley & Lang, 1994). Feelings of disgust and fear were subse-
quently assessed by two separate 5-point Likert scales that varied
from “not at all” (1), via “somewhat” (3), to “very much” (5). Partici-
pants were asked to respond promptly and according to their first
impression.
Stimulus selection was based on the averaged responses of the 15
female participants, because arousal ratings from our male partici-
pants turned out to be generally low and not sufficiently different for
the three stimulus categories (fear, disgust, neutral). The following
criteria were used to select the 10 threat- and 10 disgust-related im-
ages for the experimental task: (1) images should have the highest
and lowest fear-minus-disgust absolute difference scores to ensure
optimal separation between the two negative emotions, (2) disgust-
ing and threatening images should be within the top 30% of individ-
ual disgust or fear scores, respectively, and (3) there should be no
significant differences in averaged arousal and valence ratings be-
tween the selected fear- and disgust-evoking pictures. Twenty neutral
pictures, with minimal fear and disgust ratings, were matched as best
as possible with the negative pictures on the basis of their visual
complexity and figure-background composition. Almost all selected
pictures depicted only one object, one animal, or one person performing
a simple act.1 The neutral pictures had significantly higher valence rat-
ings and significantly lower arousal ratings than the negative pictures.
Therewere twice asmanyneutral images to equate the number of emo-
tion versus neutral pictures and to prevent participants from develop-
ing a negative mood. Characteristics of the 40 selected pictures are
indicated in Table 1.
2.3. Procedure
Before the experiment, participants were asked to fill in Dutch
versions of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Ploeg, Defares, &
Spielberger, 1980) and the Revised Disgust Scale (DS-R; Olatunji et
al., 2007). Then, the covert orienting task was explained followed by
two training blocks of 24 trials each.
Fig. 1 describes the sequence of events in one example trial of the
task. Each trial began with the presentation of a central fixation cross
(1000 ms), which was followed by an image cue (231×231 pixels; 7°
visual angle viewed at 75 cm) presented in the middle of the screen.
Shortly after cue onset, a target (letter Z or N, font Arial, size 7.5)
appeared for 50 ms either above, below, left, or right of the image
cue (approximately 4.5° visual angle from the center of the screen).
The cue-target interval varied randomly within test blocks and
could be either 200 ms, 500 ms, 800 ms, or 1100 ms. There were 16
test blocks, each composed of 40 trials (10 disgust, 10 fear, 20 neu-
tral) and interrupted by breaks. Each picture was paired with each
cue-target interval and each of these combinations was repeated1 For the fear-evoking category there were two exceptions to this rule, one image
depicted a gun attack on another person (matched in the neutral category with two
people in discussion on a terrace), and one image depicted rescue workers around a
car wreckage (matched in the neutral category with several people having a picnic).four times, giving a total of 640 trials. The identity and the position
of the target (above, below, left, right) varied at random. Each test
block could be started by means of a button press by the participants.
Their task was to indicate as accurately and quickly as possible which
target was presented (Z or N) by pressing the corresponding key-
board button, with their left or right index finger, respectively. The
image cue remained on the screen until a response was made with
a maximum of 1200 ms. Image cue offset was followed by a 500 ms
blank screen or a feedback screen if no response was made. Partici-
pants had to remain fixated on the center of the screen. As the pre-
sentation time of the target letter was only 50 ms, it was impossible
to make a directed eye movement to the target letter.
3. Results
Mean questionnaire scores were STAI-state=34.1 (SD 7.7, range
22–57), STAI-trait=37.0 (SD 8.2, range 22–60), and DS-R=53 (SD
7.6, range 30–86). STAI-state and STAI-trait scores correlated with
each other (r=0.79, pb0.001), but both did not correlate with DS-R
scores. Two participants obtained relatively high STAI — state/trait
anxiety scores (one participant 57/54 and the other 51/60 respective-
ly). Two other participants obtained relatively high disgust-sensitivity
scores (total scores of 79 and 86 respectively). Analyses with or with-
out these four participants produced highly similar results; those in
which they are included are reported.
Accuracy and RT were each analysed with a 4 (Interval: 200, 500,
800, 1100 ms)×3 (Stimulus: fear, disgust, neutral) repeated mea-
sures ANOVA. Accuracy ranged from 0.69 to 0.97, with an average of
0.85 correct target identifications. A significant main effect of interval
was present (F(3,87)=5.39, pb0.01, ηp2=0.16) as well as a signifi-
cant Interval×Stimulus interaction (F(6, 174)=2.57, pb0.05, ηp2=
0.08). Average accuracy was generally lower in the 200 ms interval
condition (M200=0.83) as compared to the other intervals (M500=
0.86,M800=0.87,M1100=0.86). Follow-up analyses per cue-target in-
terval showed that the effect of stimulus was significant for the
200 ms interval condition only (F(2,58)=5.24, pb0.05, ηp2=0.15)
with less accurate target identifications for the disgust-evoking pictures
(Mdisgust=0.80) as compared to the neutral pictures (Mneutral=0.85,
pb0.05) and the fear-evoking pictures (Mfear=0.85, p=0.07).
Mean RT values for each cell are presented in Fig. 2, calculated for
correct responses only. RTs shorter than 200 ms were considered
guesses and were excluded from analyses. Significant main effects
were found for both interval (F(3,87)=91,9, pb0.001, ηp2=0.76)
and stimulus (F(2, 58)=5.94, pb0.01, ηp2=0.17) as well as a signifi-
cant Stimulus×Interval interaction (F(6,174)=9.33, pb0.001, ηp2=
0.24). With regards to the main effect of interval, RTs for the shortest
cue-target interval (M200=550 ms) were slower compared to all
other intervals (M500=501 ms; M800=497; M1100=513 ms; all
psb0.001). With regards to the main effect of stimulus, only one
pairwise comparison reached significance, revealing that, across the
different cue-target intervals, RTs were slower when targets were
paired with a disgust-evoking picture (Mdisgust=520 ms) as com-
pared to a neutral picture (Mneutral=512 ms) (pb0.01). Then again,
*
Fixation (1000 ms)
Image Cue  
Target (50 ms) – presented 200, 500,
Response interval 
(max 1200 ms)Z
Inter trial interval 
(500 ms)
onset 800, or 1100 ms after cue-  
TIME
Fig. 1. Sequence of events in one example trial of the covert orienting paradigm. Note: Participants were required to identify the target (Z or N) which was presented either left,
right, top, or bottom of the central image cue. The image cue could either be neutral, disgust-evoking or fear-evoking. The image cue presented in this figure did not come from
the IAPS database but is given as an example for the neutral condition.
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almost exclusively due to the RT differences observed for the 200 ms
interval condition (see also Fig. 2). Moreover, follow-up ANOVAs for
each cue-target interval revealed that the stimulus effect was signifi-
cant for the 200 ms interval condition only (F(2,58)=25.6, pb0.001,
ηp2=0.47), with longer target identification times for the disgust-
evoking pictures (Mdisgust_200=571 ms) as compared to both the neutral
(Mneutral_200=537; pb0.001) and fear-evoking pictures (Mfear_200=
541; (pb0.001). This delay in RT did not correlate with any of the indi-
vidual difference variables (i.e., disgust sensitivity, trait anxiety, state
anxiety).Fig. 2. Mean reaction time results for each stimulus type (neutral, disgust, fear) as a
function of cue-target interval (200, 500, 800, 1100 ms).To examine the possibility that accuracy and RT results for the
200 ms cue-target interval condition were caused by different habit-
uation rates for the two sets of negative stimuli, we divided the data
set for this shortest interval into four equal-sized segments and car-
ried out a 4 (Test block: 1–4, 5–8, 9–12, 13–16)×3 (Stimulus: fear,
disgust, neutral) repeated measures ANOVA. For accuracy, no signifi-
cant effects of test block nor interactions with this factor were found.
For RT however, a significant main effect of test block was present
(F(3,87)=24.5, pb0.001, ηp2=0.46) as well as a significant Test
block×Stimulus interaction (F(6, 174)=4.47, pb0.001, ηp2=0.13).
RTs were slower for the first test blocks (Mblock1–4=591 ms) as com-
pared to all other test blocks (Mblock5–8=552 ms,Mblock9–12=531 ms,
Mblock13–16=524 ms) (all psb0.01). RTs for blocks 5–8 were also sig-
nificantly slower compared to those for blocks 9–12 and blocks 13–16
(both psb0.01). General response speed thus became gradually faster
over the course of the experiment with no significant drop in accu-
racy. More interestingly, stimulus effects on RT also became gradual-
ly smaller, with the largest effects in blocks 1–4 (F(2,58)=16.1,
pb0.001), somewhat smaller effects in blocks 5–8 (F(2,58)=5.38,
pb0.01) and blocks 9–12 (F(2,58)=5.58, pb0.01), and no significant
effects in blocks 13–16. Similar to the overall results discussed above,
these stimulus effects were effectively due to slower response times
for targets paired with the disgust-evoking pictures (see Fig. 3). Im-
portantly, even in the first set of four test blocks (but also in all
other ones), RTs were comparable for the neutral and fear-evoking
pictures. The lack of an overall effect for the fear-evoking pictures
can therefore not be explained by a faster habituation rate toward
these stimuli.
Due to our selection criteria, the average disgust-ratings for the
disgust-evoking pictures ended up to be higher than the average
fear-ratings for the fear-evoking pictures (see Table 1). Themain reason
for thismismatchwas that in our stimulus selection study, pictureswith
Fig. 3. Mean reaction time results for each stimulus type (neutral, disgust, fear) as a
function of test quarter (blocks 1–4, 5–8, 9–12, 13–16).
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cient discrimination between the emotions of interest (see also,
Libkuman et al., 2007; Mikels et al., 2005). To investigate whether this
difference in ‘emotion strength’ has contributed to the observed effects
in the 200 ms cue-target interval condition, we compared participants'
responses (accuracy and RT) for the five fear-evoking pictures that re-
ceived the highest fear-ratings in the stimulus selection study (Mean
Fear rating=3.48) with those for the five disgust-evoking pictures
that received the lowest disgust-ratings (Mean Disgust rating=3.81).
For accuracy, a significant effect of stimulus (F(1,29)=4.45, pb0.05;
ηp2=0.13) was found, revealing poorer target identification for low-
disgust evoking pictures (M=0.78) compared to high-fear evoking
pictures (M=0.83). For RT a similar pattern emerged with slower re-
sponse times for the low-disgust pictures (M=581 ms) relative to
the high-fear ones (M=545 ms) (F(1,29)=14.25, pb0.001, ηp2=
0.33). These results endorse our main findings and suggest that the
strength of the evoked emotion played no major role in obtaining our
overall results. Interestingly, the distinction between high- and low-
fear pictures corresponded exactly with a classification made on the
basis of the pictures' biological relevance, in that the high-fear pictures
were more biologically relevant (i.e., aggressive animals) than the low-
fear pictures (i.e., guns and traffic accidents). In contrast, all ten disgust-
evoking pictures could be considered to be biologically relevant (i.e.,
vomit, dirt, dead animals, rotten teeth, etc.). Consequently, the above
findings also rule out a potentially confounding influence of ‘biological
relevance’.24. Discussion
When carefully controlling the specific emotion that is elicited by
a set of negative, arousing IAPS pictures, only those evoking disgust
were found to produce significant attention bias effects. More specif-
ically, when targets were presented 200 ms following the onset of a
central picture cue, they were identified less accurately andmore slow-
ly when these pictures were disgust-evoking than when they were
fear-evoking or neutral. In addition, because similar results were not2 As a final check, an additional ANOVA was performed on the accuracy and RT re-
sults for the negative images with Emotion (fear, disgust), and Image (1–10) as
within-subjects factors. For both accuracy and RT, the Emotion×Image interactions
were not significant, revealing that differences between individual fear- and disgust-
evoking pictures were negligible and ruling out the possibility that the emotion effects
were driven by a subset of images. The pictures used were thus rather homogeneous in
their fear and disgust evoking qualities.found for longer cue-target intervals, it seems that this bias, attributed
to impaired attention disengagement by Fox et al. (2001), is rather
short-lived. These results are in broad agreementwith our expectations
and with results from other studies that compared involuntary atten-
tion effects for disgusting and fearful pictures (Carretié et al., 2011)
and for disgust- and fear-related words (Charash & McKay, 2002;
Cisler, Olantunji, et al., 2009). On the other hand, the complete absence
of an effect for the fear-evoking images was not anticipated and also
contrasts with findings from some earlier studies (e.g., Fox et al.,
2001; Koster et al., 2004, 2006).
The prolonged RTs for targets paired with the disgust-evoking pic-
tures might be explained by the notion that, at very short cue-target
intervals (200 ms), more time and attention resources are needed to
fully assess the potential risk implied in these images. In contrast,
full assessment may not have been necessary for the fear-evoking im-
ages because it might have been sufficiently clear at an early stage of
processing (i.e., before 200 ms) that they were hazardous, allowing
fast disengagement and quick responding. Indeed, such explanation
would make evolutionary sense, as potentially dangerous and life-
threatening circumstances require quick action and thus a rapid shift
of attention away from its source. In contrast, filthy or horrible situa-
tions may not demand an immediate action, but instead would call
for a more thorough assessment of the circumstances to reveal the
exact risk (e.g. contamination). Carretié et al. (2011) formulated this
account in terms of costs and benefits, suggesting that less costs are
associated with further exploration of disgusting pictures as com-
pared to fearful ones. Indeed, it seemsmore useful if threatening stim-
uli are quickly detected with no additional attention so that all
available resources can be directed toward finding and executing the
appropriate response.
Even though this interpretation sounds plausible, the absence of
RT differences between neutral and fear-evoking pictures needs fur-
ther consideration, as it contrasts with several studies showing an at-
tention bias toward threatening materials (Fox et al., 2001; Koster et
al., 2004, 2006). On the other hand, it should be noted that fear-
related attention biases have been demonstrated most consistently
in high-anxious participants (see reviews by Bar-Haim et al., 2007;
Cisler, Bacon, et al., 2009; Yiend, 2010) and only two of our partici-
pants could be considered high-anxious relative to the rest of the
sample. It is therefore likely that the fairly standard anxiety levels of
our participants have contributed to the lack of significant findings
for the fear-evoking images. In comparison, the response delay ob-
served for the disgust-evoking images in the 200 ms interval condi-
tion occurred despite normal DS-R scores and was not modulated
by the participants' level of disgust sensitivity. As already mentioned
in the results section, a second reason for the fear null-effect could be
that the fear-evoking pictures might have affected responses at the
start of the task, but were not observed in the overall analyses be-
cause of quick habituation. We excluded this possibility however, by
showing that there were no RT delays for the fear-evoking pictures
in the first blocks of testing. Moreover, evidence for habituation was
found for the disgust-evoking pictures, producing larger RT increases
at the beginning of the task, which became gradually smaller toward
the end (see Fig. 3).
As a third reason, it could be argued that we didn't find an effect of
fear because our set of fear-evoking pictures evoked only minor feel-
ings of fear. This indeed could be the case, although the same essen-
tially holds for the disgust-evoking pictures (i.e., they elicited only
minor feelings of disgust). Moreover, equating the pictures for ‘emo-
tion strength’ (and thereby also for biological relevance) made no dif-
ference for the key results in the 200 ms interval. Selecting pictures
with higher fear-ratings was not possible as they also received higher
disgust ratings, causing insufficient discrimination between the emo-
tions of interest. Moreover, the flip-side of this argument is that ear-
lier studies, which claimed to have investigated effects of fearful
pictures, have in fact studied the effects of pictures that elicited fear
6 J.C. van Hooff et al. / Acta Psychologica 143 (2013) 1–6and disgust. Hence, it is possible that these added feelings of disgust
explain why they found an attention bias for their “threatening” ma-
terials and we didn't.
The fact that in the 200 ms interval condition, attention engage-
ment effects were found exclusively for one out of the two sets of
negative pictures suggests that some basic form of emotion categori-
zation must have taken place at early perceptual processing stages,
presumably before full object recognition and conscious inference
(cf., Barrett & Bar, 2009). Indeed, in support of an early differential ef-
fect for fearful and disgusting images, recent ERP research found dis-
tinct P1 amplitudes (peak latency 96 ms) for fearful and disgusting
IAPS pictures, suggesting that “sophisticated visual categorization
within the class of threat could occur during the initial feedforward
sweep of sensory processing” (Krusemark & Li, 2011, p. 3433). In ac-
cord with this suggestion and the current results, attention biases for
disgusting stimuli are thus not necessarily restricted to later, more
controlled processing stages, as has sometimes been proposed. Such
suggestions on the other hand were made primarily on the basis of
research with verbal material (e.g., Cisler, Olantunji, et al., 2009) or
facial expressions (e.g., Santos et al., 2008), which, compared to pic-
tures, may have created less immediate- and only secondary emo-
tional impact.
In any case, the attention engagement effect for disgust-evoking
images as observed in the current study appeared to be rather short-
lived. In addition, there was no evidence for attention avoidance of
these images at the longer cue-target intervals. Very brief attention ef-
fects have been observed before for “threatening” pictures, typically
demonstrated in spatial cueing- and probe detection tasks by the
presence of an attention effect for short exposure durations and the
absence- or the reversed effect for long(er) exposure durations (e.g.,
Koster et al., 2005, 2006;Mogg et al., 2004). In attentional blink exper-
iments, similar inferences have been made with respect to gradually
smaller emotion effects with increasing time lags (Ciesielski et al.,
2010). Together, these results (including ours) demonstrate the im-
portance of investigating not only the magnitude but also the tempo-
ral characteristics of emotion attention allocation. Most importantly,
the differential attention effect for fear- and disgust-evoking images
observed in the current study implies that in emotion-attention re-
search one should look beyond the dimensions of valence and arousal.
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